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Abstract 
 Th is article focuses on the philosophical implications of Euro-centrism and Eurocentric 
discourse for the Western human rights narrative. It is argued that there is insuﬃcient 
theoretical and practical consideration of those implications, particular for advocacy and 
activity in the so-called “Th ird World” where such arguments frequently become mere 
vehicles for the advance of economic and political neocolonialism. In many ways, colonial-
ism with a humanistic, liberal democratic “face”. Finally, a proposition is advanced that if 
the Western human rights discourse is to be eﬀectively corrected and evolve into a global 
one, critiques of Euro-centrism from outside the Western discursive world must be taken 
seriously. 
 Keywords 
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 Our subject of rumination for the moment, the western human rights 
discourse. It extends the apparently inviting pleasantry “Come, let me hear 
your voice!” Inherent in the salutation is the fact that the one objectiﬁed in 
the greeting is being invited to a pre-existing discourse. Th at may in fact be 
the rub. 
 Th e Nature and Problem of Eurocentrism 
 Th e global system as we know is largely a function not of natural evolu-
tion, but of European colonialism and neocolonialism. More importantly, 
subsequent to that historical epoch there was the imposition of an intel-
lectual paradigm that colonized knowledge itself as well as the processes for 
producing knowledge. Within the context of Euro-centrism, the West 
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both creates the parameters of legitimate discussion concerning global 
issues and then serves as the de facto “ideal type” and standard for evalua-
tive judgments relative to those issues. Even worse, Western created and 
sustained international organizations and domestic state institutions and 
legal entities are appealed to as the judicial authorities, administering admo-
nitions, sanctions, and other punishments as consequences for deviance 
from the Western forms. Not surprisingly to anyone, except perhaps the 
West itself, non-Western forms, ideas, and concepts are found wanting and 
deﬁcient and therefore subject to exclusion from the theater of debate and 
communicative legitimacy. I wrote in another piece about how the “vam-
pire” was a proper and ﬁt metaphor for Euro-centrism. It is rendered as 
such in Bob Marley’s song “Babylon Vampire,” in which he lays out its 
essential consequences. 
 Like the mythological vampire, Euro-centrism pursues its own interests 
at the expense of the psychological, sociological, economic, and political 
well-being of those it victims and does so my enrapturing them with illu-
sions of love or at least mutual interest. Most modern conﬁgurations of 
Dracula describe a tortured creature, which is spiritually disﬁgured, believ-
ing at times that he or she does indeed “love” the one they systematically 
devour. Worst of all, the great malady of the vampire’s condition is the 
denial of its own existence as ghoul. Th e vampire believes himself or herself 
to be alive and so much wants to be a part of the world, yet inevitably must 
slink back to the coﬃn, to the grains of earth of their original burial (the 
seeds of Platonic epistemology and the Enlightenment), all before the 
encroachment of the sun, ever representing the force of true illumination 
from which nothing undead may hide and by whose light they shall surely 
be judged and found wanting. Next to the sun of external recognition, there 
is no greater threat than a mirror. For the mirror represents self-criticism, 
the capacity to reﬂect on oneself as monster. When gazing out, Euro-
centrism sees nothing. Or we might better say, sees nothing beyond itself, 
believing itself to be the germinal seed of existence, without which being is 
meaningless. 
 It seems senseless for those victimized or in the path of this demon to 
despise the essence of what the creature is, for it is merely responding to its 
nature. Marimba Ani in Yurugu characterized this as the asili, or the equiv-
alent of “cultural DNA.”1 Since the predatory nature of the beast is so 
1)  Ani 2007, p. 12. 
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embedded within structure, it is unwise and dangerous to speak of “reform”. 
It must be destroyed where it lives . . . in its realm of its feeling, its “black 
heart”, and its damaged Frankensteinian mind. 
 How Historical and Present Eurocentric Power Taints Communicative 
Interchange with “Others”: How the Non-Western is Rendered “Mute” 
 Stephen Lukes, political theorist and John Gaventa, political scientist, 
present the matter in forms useful for our consideration of this question of 
human rights. Gaventa, in Power and Powerlessness,2 presents it in his 
attempt to work with and theorize about working with the disadvantaged 
in the U.S. Appalachians. He is confronted with recalcitrance on the part 
of his constituency of aid and notes that mainstream theory would be 
likely to categorize this behavior as “apathy.” But he is inclined to believe 
that what presents itself socially and empirically as “apathy,” is in fact a 
response to the historical consequences of oppressive neocolonial power. 
He references Lukes and his work in Power: A Radical View,3 where the 
latter posits three dimensions to power. 
 Th e ﬁrst dimension of power is one with which sociologists are inti-
mately acquainted, and that is the feared “power over.” Th e power under-
stood to be wielded traditionally by forces of oppression and domination. 
Th e second, certainly explored by interpretive sociologists in some detail, 
is the “power to.” Certainly, wielded by those same centers of power in 
some cases, it also the object of resistance movements. Th ey seek to acquire 
it so as to bring about reform or revolution and the amelioration of their 
condition of social injustice and exploitation. Yet, Lukes presents a third 
dimension of power, one I believe poorly comprehended within existing 
sociological theory and one that is at the foundation of Euro-centric praxis. 
Th is dimension of power is the capacity to deﬁne the political agenda. It is 
obfuscated from traditional sociological analysis because it does not present 
in the form of a validity claim for “power over” or “power to.” It describes 
itself as the mere backdrop or context for the legitimate exercise of other 
forms of power, yet it is in this power to consecrate the legitimate realms 
of rational discourse that it is more coercive than the power it facilitates. 
 It is this “third face” of power that Carter G. Woodson was referring to 
when he surmised that though the chains might be removed from the slave 
2)  Gaventa 1982. 
3)  Lukes, 2004. 
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and the signs identifying social distinctions between “whites” and “Negroes” 
taken down, the mentality of those who had been victimized by oppression 
had been “educated” in a manner such that they would reconstruct (in 
league with their oppressors) their own demise.4 It is the one referenced 
also in the historical mythological “Lynch letter” where Africans in the 
Diaspora are given an antagonistic, oppositional perception of their own 
community which would, it was believed, perpetuate enslavement without 
the mechanisms of restraint.5 It was the object of the admonition of El 
Hajj Malik el-Shabazz when he warned that one should never “ask a slave 
what he wants.” Th e slave would not know what he or she wants outside of 
the context of freedom, which would never be the object of his or her ask-
ing. As such, their response would be meaningless and to grant it, would 
be merely to grant further dispensation to the system of enslavement. Cau-
tioning us also was Audre Lorde, who told us clearly, one cannot use the 
“master’s tools” to deconstruct the “master’s house.”6 So to the critics within 
Western critical theory who noted the paradox of arguing that the systems 
of Eurocentric modernity were corrupt and “unfree,” while simultaneously 
maintaining that the intellectual products of those civilizations were and 
are the only methodological tools for human freedom. 
 How Historical and Present Eurocentric Ethnocentrism Taints Com-
municative Interchange: How the West is Rendered “Deaf” 
 As regards the human rights discourse particularly, we might employ the 
rich metaphorical and analogical framework given us in Greco-Roman 
mythology in the characters of Echo and Narcissus. Echo was a nymph in 
love with her own voice. Zeus was taken to consorting with the nymphs 
and employed Echo as an agent to occupy the time and thoughts of his 
spouse Hera, while he continued his ceaseless adulteries. Hera eventually 
exposed the plot and punished Echo by allowing her to say only the last 
words of other’s sentences. Narcissus was a human deemed to be so beauti-
ful that all who saw him fell in love with him. Echo later meets Narcissus 
and falls in love with him as well. She is shy, so she follows him and reaches 
a vantage point where she can see him, but he can not see her. He becomes 
lost and says “Is anyone here?” Echo answered “Here, here, here.” He forces 
4)  Woodson 2006. 
5)  Embree 1931. 
6)  Bereano 1984, pp. 110–113. 
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her to expose herself. When she does, she communicates her love to him in 
a nonverbal way, but he rebuﬀs her. Eventually she prays for death. She is 
given death, but her voice lived on, beloved of the goddess Aphrodite. 
 Narcissus later gets his come-uppance. A girl, who falls in love with him, 
prays that he suﬀer from the unrequited love he engendered in others. Th e 
goddess Nemesis curses him by making him fall in love with his own 
reﬂection. 
 We have to begin my contemplating this character Echo. She is deﬁned 
initially as loving her own voice. One might say that the capacity of Euro-
pean colonialism and neocolonialism to exercise predominant power in 
deﬁning the parameters of global aﬀairs has enabled it to stamp the world 
with its own voice. In fact, much of the period of classical colonialism was 
spent “planting” the voice of European forms and their associated Euro-
centric rationale in all corners of the world. Th us, religions were forcibly 
transformed into either Western forms or hybrids. Th ose who resisted were 
killed or at least marginalized as “heathens.” Capitalist ﬂows, transferring 
the world’s material resources to Europe, the US, and Japan were codiﬁed 
under various ideological banners of development, globalization, globalism, 
or interdependence and those who resisted branded socialist or communist 
enemies or reactionaries. Western state structures and processes and their 
political liberalisms were presented as “democratization.” Systematically, 
every face of human social, political, economic, cultural, and psychological 
life was molded to reﬂect the worldview of the colonial masters, even the 
maps of the world themselves. 
 Frankie Goes to Hollywood recorded an introduction to their Welcome 
to the Pleasuredome album in which the lead singer says repeatedly “Th e 
World is My Oyster.”7 Certainly, this was the view of the global conquer-
ors. Here, we say the world is my Echo. For the voice of the world became 
the voice of the West. Th us there was no “voice of the oppressed” that 
might reasonable be listened to, or at least that could be recognized author-
itatively as such. It’s important too, to recognize the critical reality that 
Karl Marx so exceptionally lays out as regards the inextricable link between 
the ideological superstructure and the base of control of the means of pro-
duction beneath. Echo speaks initially to allow the god to commit adul-
tery. In fact, this adultery is actually rape, since Zeus, as the most powerful 
deity, cannot be resisted in his sexual advances in any greater degree than 
African women could resist the incessant advances of lecherous slave-
7)  Hollywood, 1985. 
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masters. Echo then is the foil or the ruse for the criminal plot to exploit the 
nymphs and to deceive. Euro-centrism was born as the self-fulﬁlling ideo-
logical justiﬁcation for European domination and oppression of the world. 
It was a foil in that its ontological and epistemological frameworks and 
arguments were not about truth or knowledge, but targeted instead at 
ideological “softening” of the objects of victimization. It pushed the ethic 
“thou shalt not steal” as it stole everything in sight. “Th ou shalt not kill as 
it slaughtered everything and in the name of God. Th ou shalt not take the 
name of the Lord they God in vain as it connected the messiah to white 
supremacy imagery and ﬁlled the heads of black and brown people with 
ﬂying white angels, white last suppers, and white gods. 
 In Scott’s book, Domination and the Arts of Resistance,8 he presents us 
with the critical dimensions of Echo’s downfall. For the extent of Eurocen-
tric domination of global discourse presented the would-be global rulers 
with an inability to access the most critical element necessary to maintain 
their authority, the thoughts of the oppressed. Within the thoughts of the 
oppressed one might ﬁnd strategies for resistance and revolution. But they 
heard nothing, but their own voices. Every serf, and slave, and woman, 
and savage spoke of “yes, sir boss” and the master and mistress were left 
sure of only one thing that they had heard nothing. What they had heard 
was the sound of their own oppression being echoed back to them. Th eir 
inability to get past the wall they so heavily fortiﬁed and maintained to see 
the enemy certainly beyond was the undoing of colonialism in its initial 
form. When the “voice of the oppressed” was ultimately heard in all its 
clarity, it came with a sword, drenched often in blood. 
 But all was not lost for the Western world. For in the downfall of colo-
nial empire, there remained the ideological rationale itself. Th is rationale 
gloriﬁed and legitimate Western forms and concepts. Where it holds sway, 
we see Western political, social, and economic structure and we hear still 
the voices of “democracy” and “liberalization” and “freedom.” Echoes still. 
Yet, this is the plight of Narcissus. Narcissus was not there when Echo was 
punished, but like Echo he is drunk with his own legend. For her it was her 
voice, reﬂected in every corner of the world still even after the demise of 
her glory. For him, it was not the literal repetition of his voice, but the 
veneration of his image. In many ways he is both less arrogant and more 
self-centered than Echo. For Narcissus feigns self-loathing. He rejects the 
admiration of others for him, resisting and turning down the Echo. Th is is 
8)  Scott 1990. 
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the position of those Westerners who lead the human rights discourse 
today. Th ey are quick in their criticisms of the West and its history, but in 
their rejection fail to recognize that even their visions of liberation are 
embedded, not in a globally constructed discourse, but in the reiﬁcation of 
the same imperial structures that necessitated the move towards “human 
rights” in the ﬁrst place. Th is is the dialectical positioning of the ex-white 
supremacist who travels the world earning huge sums as an antiracist 
speaker and trainer. Ask them whether their status as an antiracist is also a 
consequence of white supremacy, since no person of color similarly politi-
cally situated would be likely to garner such status, and they will often fail 
to get the question. 
 Despite Narcissus apparent “strange nobility” in steering the love of 
others from his visage, he himself comes to be occupied with a contempla-
tion of his own image as reﬂected. Th us, while the Western human rights 
advocate does not require by statement, the advocacy of Western forms, 
these forms are a presumption when he or she engages the debate over 
human rights. Human means the Western deﬁnition of “human.” It must, 
otherwise, it would be a matter of debate and contention since there are 
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of humanity across cultures. Th e lack of contention is 
not an artifact of universal agreement (the plurality of societies across the 
world being the empirical evidence mitigating against such a reductionist 
conclusion), but rather monologue. Likewise, the “rights” theory of human 
advancement is inevitably a philosophical situation within the Western 
discourse of rights and social contracts, clearly foreign to most societies, 
but presumed. Th ese foundational epistemological assumptions are part of 
that aforementioned “third face” of power. Th ey are embedded in the agenda 
of human rights itself. 
 Th e Folly of Seeking “Democracy” in View of Th e Resulting Western 
Ideological Monologue 
 To assure that no real contention over these imperialistic presumptions is 
allowed, there is a Narcissus tendency, or assimilative impulse, that takes 
the “voice of the oppressed” and ﬁxes it within the context of the ongoing 
Western discourse. It is a form of co-optation. If you say “democracy,” the 
immediate presumption is that you mean Western democracy and that 
you are speaking of the Western developed form as if there was no other. 
Th e notion that there are theories of democracy that do not stem from the 
7
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West and are even hostile to the bourgeois notions of the same is not part 
of the legitimate debate. If you say “development” or something similar in 
economic terms, everyone assumes you either mean traditional global cap-
italism or at least some “liberalization” of the same. If not, maybe you 
mean Marxian socialism. Th e notion that you mean none of that and that 
there are economic systems that have nothing to do with the West that 
might oﬀer not only diﬀerent, but better conﬁgurations for human eco-
nomic empowerment and liberation is not on the table. One of the most 
diﬃcult meta-assumptions is the Enlightenment proposition of the indi-
vidual, central to the Western notion of rights, but extremely problematic 
for the collectivist societies of the world, particularly in the developing 
world. Th e notions of alternative theories of the individual, or even of 
human liberation theories that totally discard Western individualism are 
not negotiable. 
 I’d like to present an empirical example of problems posed by Western 
human rights discourse using various examples from traditional Africa, 
particularly the Bantu of the southern part of the continent. One of the 
principle issues of human rights is the necessity for the institutionalization 
of processes and structures designed to protect these “rights.” Often this 
devolves into inherently and repeatedly failed attempts to import whole-
sale Western judicial procedures and forms out of their “natural habitat.” 
Th ere are some fundamental aspects central to African traditional judiciary 
that are likely to be missed by those caught conceptually in the Echo-
Narcissus dialectic. Th e normal activist strategy is “Echo” in that the ideal 
forms for dispute resolution are presumed to be Western courts and con-
nected structures. It is “Narcissus” in the sense that African traditional 
aspirations for justice and law and order are “heard” as analogous to the 
claims presented by and on behalf of Western liberalism. 
 Alternative Non-Western Perspectives on Democratizing Political 
Formations: Selected African Cases 
 Central in African traditional systems of justice are the concepts of spa-
tially and locality. Power, political and judicial, is wielded among the Bantu 
of Southern Africa via a communal political formation known as mbongi. 
Th e relevance of this term to our theoretical exposition here is evident in 
its frequent translation in Western discourse as “democracy” or as a syn-
onym for “democracy.” Th is pagan, as in village, egalitarian construction 
8
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may be communalist, but bears little if any resemblance to the political 
structures of the West, in even their most socialist moments. Mbongi quite 
literally translates into an indigenous concept which relates it to the cen-
tralized meeting place within the collective. It is centralized in that it might 
be described as equally accessible both to all potential participating politi-
cal actors and to all foreseeable, navigable points of destination in the local 
spatial map. It is a nexus without which one cannot traverse daily. Its very 
existential nature establishes a commonality in the routinization of the 
everyday lives of the people. Th e selection of a location for the would-be 
“house of social justice, then, may be the most critical decision an advocate 
will make. 
 Th e term “mbongi” refers literally to a simple architectural structure centrally located in tile 
villages of the Bantu and of those in the Kongo region in particular. Th e shelter is the seat 
and site of local communal power and is the physical manifestation and representation of 
ancestral political and social authority. Th is entity is of critical importance within the 
Kibantu, the corpus of Bantu philosophy. Th e term “mbongi” derives from the verbal root 
“bonga” which, in the Kikongo language and related linguistic dialects of the region, 
signiﬁes the act of accepting possession of or owning.9 
 History is littered with the ashes of failed peacemaking and reconciliation 
eﬀorts by Eurocentric progressivisms, which chose as their geographic foci 
“national” capitals, or state or regional centers. Having removed them-
selves at the outset from the constituent communities, from the ethnic 
traditional authorities that could legitimate any settlements, and from the 
spatial dimension which by itself institutionalizes judicial change in the 
everyday interactions of the people, they could not hope to succeed. 
 And by what “laws” are these judicial disputes to be judged? In Euro-
centrism, it is the law of the text, of constitutions, of declarations, of prom-
ulgated state statute that reigns. Certainly there  is customary law, but that 
law is seen as having been transcended in modernity and survives merely 
as an ediﬁce for ﬁlling in contingencies where legislation has not yet been 
enacted. 
 In the African traditional society, it is customary law which reigns. Th is 
is due to the fact that customary law is not a pre-modern phase in route to 
an alleged evolutionary trajectory toward Greco-Roman models of legali-
zation, but rather the accumulated experiential knowledge of the people in 
9)  FU-KIAU 1985. 
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historical reﬂection upon the rendering and maintenance of social justice 
among one another. Any other “law” would be viewed not only as imper-
sonal, but as foreign, explaining the problematic nature of the “nation-
state” as the center of “human rights” advocacy in this sphere. Customary 
law draws its resilience and relevance as a result of its role as a repository 
for socio-cultural value and systems of aesthetics. Any judicial conclusion 
would therefore have to be inculcated into customary law to be deemed 
legitimate and truly binding in the minds of the mass of the people. F. U. 
Okafor in his book Th e Igbo Philosophy of Law terms this communal based 
system an Ohacracy, the collective will of the people.10 
 Customary law in the maintenance of Ma’at (spiritual and material balance in the uni-
verse as set out by divine law) is used to settle disputes among the people within the com-
munity. In the Igbo traditional society it is called Omenala which refers to the practices and 
customs which apply to any aspect all aspects of life in the community designed to insure 
social harmony and peace.11 Customary law becomes important not because of its rules but, 
because of its underlying values.12 
  Th e objective in the Gikuyu court system according to Jomo Kenyatta in Facing Mount 
Kenya is also to resolve conﬂict using established customary law by way of arbitration. Th ere 
are no written rules on how to decide cases. Th is is unlike the Euro-centric system where it 
is done with precedents. Instead, customary judges [elders] rely on the collective wisdom of 
the people.13 
 Th en there is the question of “who” will do the deciding. If one is governed 
properly by the dictates of customary law, what is preeminent in the selec-
tion of judicial authorities is their personal experiential knowledge of that 
law. One would have to in that context recognize the overarching author-
ity of the socially-deﬁned elders in the administration of any credible judi-
ciary. Th ere is in this idea the concept of age. Th ose who have lived in the 
material realm longer are presumed to be wiser with respect to the cosmic 
laws. Th ey are closest in temporal spatiality to the ancestors who are in the 
realm of all knowledge. Th ere is also residence, which may or may not be 
the same. Th is refers to the length of time a person has dwelled in the com-
munity. Again, there is the presumption that longevity in this respect is 
evidence of one’s longstanding knowledge of, status of being subject to, 
10)  Okafor 1992. 
11)  Nwala 1985. 
12)  Obe 1992, pp. 327–351. 
13)  Obe, 1992, pp. 327–351. 
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and observation of the administration of customary law. In this respect, 
Euro-centrism is most dangerous to its liberalist intent. For too often the 
goal is the implementation of “democracy,” inevitably meaning the replace-
ment of traditional, often ethnically-based elder leadership structures with 
more populist, external structures. Th ese can be created, but they have 
little or no real authority on the local level. 
 According to the Omenala [custom] it is the job of the elders to preserve peace in the com-
munity and maintain social order. Th e elders, which in most instances are the heads of 
families of each household, are given the responsibility of preserving social harmony among 
the people by reconciliation, as well as settling familial disputes within the family or between 
diﬀerent families.14 
 Th e Council of Elders who make up the court system in Akan civilization is called the 
Badwafo and their job is to settle disputes between the family members and groups which 
include theft, slander, property, and intermarriage conﬂict. 
  According to Bascom in Th e Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, the elders (the Bale) are 
responsible for the resolution of conﬂicts because they have the most extensive knowledge of 
the traditional way of life. Th e Bale also serve as the principal judges in deciding disputes.15 
 Th e function of the elder in the Gikuyu then becomes “one of harmonizing the activities 
of various groups living and departed. In his capacity of mediator his family group and 
community in general respect him for his seniority and wisdom and in turn respects the 
seniority of the ancestral spirits”.16 
 Last but not least, there is the question of what procedures will be applied. 
Very commonly the Western conception of “blind justice” is central to 
rights advocates. So too, is the adversarial dialectic in which there are the 
accused and the accuser. Often the accuser is the state or international 
organizations acceded authority by the state to make such judgment. Yet 
adversarial justice, in a sense, is precisely opposed to African traditional 
understandings of justice. First and foremost, the “accused” is most likely 
a member of the community. Th e goal of all community processes is to 
heal the rift. In fact, many African societies prior to colonialism had no 
word for “jail.” Th ey did have words for their supreme social penalty, 
“exile.” And we should note that this was and is in traditional order, still 
analogous to a death penalty. Of course, it could literally mean death in 
terms of one being physically expelled from the community and forced to 
contend with external forces of nature and humanity without the protection 
14)  Nwala 1985; Paris 1995. 
15)  Bascom, 1984. 
16)  Kenyatta 1953, p. 265. 
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of the society. But more philosophically speaking, exile was a permanent 
penalty which disconnected the individual from the collective. Th e African 
conception of the individual was that individuality was collectively deﬁned 
and thus to be disconnected was to die in spiritual and social terms. 
 Th e Eurocentric science ﬁction series Star Trek: Th e Next Generation 
played at non-Western conceptions of individuality and its clash with 
external cultural forms. Two particular examples come to mind here. Th e 
ﬁrst involves the creatures known as the Borg. Whereas in Western terms 
disconnection and exile from the core was styled as “freedom,” for the Borg 
it was to be cast into a world of misery and to move from universal clarity 
and essential cosmic connection to the whole to the solitary and silent 
isolation of personhood. Th e second example was a Klingon ritual in which 
one took blame for his families sins. Th e culmination of the ritual was the 
turning away from that familial representative and the nulliﬁcation of their 
social identity. 
 Assuming the oﬀense is not one warranting the supreme punishment, 
of which there are few, then the goal of any judicial proceeding is the 
reintegration of the individual in the community and the provision of 
reparation for those wronged. Th is mitigates against an adversarial meth-
odology because such a methodology conﬁrms the disequilibrium that is 
the enemy of the restorative justice process. Justice cannot be blind either, 
for if justice is blind, She cannot conﬁrm that there has in fact, been a 
restoration of equilibrium. Using the stolen Eurocentric symbol of Liberty 
with scales (actually a bastardized form of the ancient African goddess 
Ma’at) as a metaphor, we might note that all sorts of mischief are likely to 
occur with the scales and their contents and weighing in the absence of her 
capacity for sight. 
 In the Ashanti civilization, private oﬀenses are called eﬁsems. Eﬁsems aﬀect the social rela-
tions of persons or groups living in the community, while public oﬀenses (Oman Akyiwade) 
aﬀect the relationship between the community on the one hand, and the chief and the 
ancestors on the other.17 
 Among the Akan, the aim in settling household disputes is to reconcile the parties through 
arbitration.18 Th is is done through a rite of reconciliation in the Mpata, a reconciliation fee 
in the form of a drink, accompanied by an apology, is given to the oﬀended. Both parties 
then swear by the elders present that they will hereafter live at peace with each other”.19 
17)  Ayittey 1991. 
18)  Manoukian 1950, p. 40. 
19)  Ayittey 1991, p. 45. 
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  Among the Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, the goal is to resolve the matters through 
peaceful settlement. Th e Bale (elders) are consistent with the maintenance of Ma’at because 
they settle disputes by deliberation and discussion, rather than by force, correcting the wrong 
doing by compensation except for oﬀenses such as murder and they adjudicate and assess the 
matter impartially (1969) 
 In the Gikuyu court system, the elder looks at the conﬂict and decides what would be best 
for the individuals who are feuding and the collective society writ large. It is recognized that 
when there is conﬂict there is disunity, and when there is disunity there is disorder, which is 
a violation of Ma’at (harmony, order, and balance). Th e elder’s job in reconciliation and 
the restoration of Ma’at (social order) is to “bring the disputing parties into a mutual agree-
ment, and to avoid any act of vengeance which might result in the breaking up of the 
family group”.20 
  In Schapera’s book Th e Tswana it is noted that people can appeal to the Chief Court if 
they are dissatisﬁed with the decisions of informal courts. In the Chief Court people involved 
in the dispute or those accused of an oﬀense always appear and speak for themselves (they 
plead in person). Th e judge (elder), in reaching his decision about the customary law, relies 
on personal knowledge of the law and upon the guidance of others present in court. All cases 
are heard in public and anyone present is free to attend and take part in the proceedings. 
Th is includes questioning parties involved, the witnesses, reviewing of the evidence, etc. 
After all the evidence is heard the judge renders a decision.21 
  Th e Igbo have a similar system. When a man from a neighboring village is accused of 
stealing property, he is brought in by his accuser. Th e Priest reports the matter to the Elders 
of the village, and also to the Elders of the accused. Th ere is a “trial” at the marketplace the 
next day. Th e Elders pile their Ofo (a staﬀ that symbolizes the link between the Ancestors in 
the spiritual realm and the Elders seeking to exact Ma’at in the form of justice in the mate-
rial realm) on the ground and the Priest of Ala asks the ancestors for guidance in ﬁnding 
the truth. He asks the Ancestors to “help us try the case impartially, and assist us when we 
endeavor to ﬁnd examples of the procedure in former times. If the accused has stolen the 
[item] you constrain him to confess.” A libation is then poured for the Ancestors to join in 
the gathering. After the pouring of the libation each Priest from the village says “Life of men 
and women-protect us all.” 
  Th en the accuser and the accused tell their story of the events that took place. Witnesses 
are called to tell what they know about the event and they are told that they “must not do 
it in the spirit of envy or hatred for you may be called upon to swear.” Th e Elders as well as 
the public can ask questions and a decision is made by the Elders. If the accused has sworn 
an oath to Ala than a decision is reached by a Priest outside the village. Delegates who are 
not related to the accused or the accuser are summoned and after they have been picked they 
are sworn to say to Ala “If these men go to Igwe and conceal or falsify what Igwe tells them 
may you Ala, Ancestors, and Ofo take away their lives.” Th ey solidify the oath by sharing 
Kola nut to symbolize unity and a commitment to the ancestors and the Creator in seeking 
justice [Ma’at].22
20)  Kenyatta 1953, p. 214. 
21)  Schapera, 1953, pp. 53–57. 
22)  Meek, 1937, p. 151 
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African traditional society takes the position that the events that are in 
dispute are best told by those who participated. Th ere are no advocates 
because it is the disputants who can best tell their stories as only they know 
how. Th ere are no bars on what can be “admitted into evidence” as in the 
Euro-centric system because all information is relevant to coming to a fair 
and just determination. Everyone can ask questions about the events because 
they all have a stake in the outcome and want to know the truth. 
 Th e Elders who decide the case based on customary law are trusted 
because they are respected in the community for their wisdom. Th e elders 
understand that if they fail in their duties than they are subjected to spir-
itual as well as material sanctions. Th e Oath to tell the truth before the 
Ancestors facilitates a just and fair outcome because failing to do so may 
have unwanted consequences from the spiritual realm that can aﬀect an 
individual family or the entire community. 
 Th e Irreconcilability of Th ese Alternative Conceptions of 
Democratization and the Implications for a Westernized 
“Human Rights” Pursuit 
 Th ose that would politically “liberate” African people or bring them polit-
ical “freedom” through various mechanisms of judicial responsibility should 
be wary of assuming that the Eurocentric forms of those will provide any 
acceptable vehicle. Not only will they fail, but worse, they run the risk 
of exacerbating conditions of colonialism and neocolonialism in the areas 
where they are applied. Th is takes us back to the original problem of the 
Echo-Narcissus dialectic, “hearing their voices.” Question one, Echo says 
to us that which Euro-centrists are likely to hear is that which they desire 
to hear. It is sound of their own aspirations for liberation from their own 
self-constructed systems of oppression reﬂected back in the words of those 
they have victimized. Question two, having heard, however errantly, are 
they victimized then by Narcissus and the belief that not only is the voice 
of the aspiration an echo, but the satisfaction of the aspiration inevitably 
to be found in the mechanisms of oppression wielded by the colonizers 
themselves? 
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